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Abstract 
The topics of euthanasia and assisted suicide are of profound importance in terms of law, ethics, religion, and 
social  values.  The  question  whether  assisted  dying  should  be  legalised  is  often  treated,  by  judges  and 
commentators alike, as a question which transcends national boundaries and diverse legal systems. In this 
article we seek to examine the ECtHR’s approach, the different legal routes by which attempts are made to 
legalise assisted dying and improvements in end of life decision making. In this article, we shall try to answer the 
question of whether or not voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide are morally and legally acceptable. 
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1. Introduction 
The first substantive right proclaimed by the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
“Convention”) is the right to life, set out in Article 2
1. The right to life is listed first because it is the 
most basic human right of all: if one could be arbitrarily deprived of one’s right to life
2, all other 
rights would become illusory. The fundamental nature of the right is also clear from the fact that it is 
“non-derogable”: it may not be denied even in “time of war or other public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation”. 
The Convention does not otherwise clarify what “life” is, or when it begins or ends. Indeed, in 
the  absence  of  a  European  (or  worldwide)  legal  or  scientific  consensus  on  the  matter,  the 
Commission (when it existed) and the Court were unwilling to set precise standards in these regards. 
As the Court put it in the case of Vo v. France
3:
(…) the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which 
the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere, notwithstanding an evolutive 
interpretation of the Convention, a “living instrument  which must be interpreted  in the light of 
present-day conditions” (…) there is no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition 
of the beginning of life.
Rather than imposing a uniform standard, the Commission and ECtHR thus assessed and 
assess matters relating to the beginning of life only in a marginal way, on a case-by-case basis, while 
leaving considerable freedom to States to regulate the matters in question themselves, as long as they 
approach them in an appropriate way,  in particular by  giving appropriate weight to  the various 
interests at stake and by carefully balancing those interests. This can be noticed from the case-law of 
the Convention organs on abortion, euthanasia and assisted death. The term of “abortion” is well 
known, but the terms of “euthanasia” and “assisted suicide” are controversial. 
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1 (1) Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in 
the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. (2) 
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force 
which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to 
effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c)  in  action  lawfully  taken  for  the 
purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.  
2 “Life” here means human life: neither the right to life of animals, nor the right to existence of “legal persons”
is covered by the concept; 
3 Vo v. France, Application no. 53924/00; 795
Hippocrates mentioned euthanasia in the Hippocratic Oath, “To please no one will I prescribe 
a deadly drug nor give advice which may cause his death”. “Active euthanasia” refers to a deliberate 
act to accelerate the death of a dying patient. Euthanasia comes from the Greek word “eu” which 
means “goodly” or “well” and “thanatos” meaning death
4.
“Assisted  death”  is  a  model  that  includes  both  what  has  been  called  physician-assisted 
“suicide” and voluntary active euthanasia. It suggests a difference in the degree of involvement and 
behaviour. “Physician-assisted suicide” entails making lethal means available to the patient to be 
used at a time of the patient’s own choosing (at the patient’s autonomous request). By contrast, 
voluntary active euthanasia entails the physician taking an active role in carrying out the patient’s 
request, and usually involves intravenous delivery of a lethal substance. Physician-assisted suicide is 
seen to be far easier emotionally for the physician than euthanasia as he or she does not have to 
directly cause a death; he or she merely supplies the means for the patient’s personal use
5.
Despite  the  fact  that  autonomy  has  been  used  in  many  distinct  senses,  it  seems  that  in 
biomedical ethics there is a common core understanding of the meaning of this notion. According to 
this idea, autonomy means self-government
6. If a person’s decisions, beliefs, desires are due to such 
external influences as unreflected socialization, manipulation, coercion, and brainwashing, they are 
not  autonomous  but  heteronomous.  If  a  person’s  beliefs  concerning  some  matter  are  false, 
inconsistent with each other, or she is insufficiently informed about that matter without realizing it, 
then she is not autonomous with respect that matter. Similarly, if a person’s behaviour results from 
such things as compulsion and weakness of will, then it is not autonomous but heteronomous. 
Thus, is there a right to die according to the Convention? Could we interpret that the suicide, 
assisted suicide and euthanasia are allowed by the Convention? 
2. Paper content 
2.1. Does the jurisprudence of ECtHR acknowledge the existence of a “right to die”?
7
Article 2 of the Convention requires that everyone’s “right to life” be “protected by law”.
Apart from the death penalty, it envisages only limited circumstances in which a person can be 
deprived of this right; none of these relate to suicide or euthanasia. This raises several difficult and 
overlapping sets of questions. First of all: when does life – and therefore the right to protection of 
life by law – end? Secondly: is it acceptable to provide palliative care to a terminally ill or dying 
person, even if the treatment may, as a side-effect, contribute to the shortening of the patient’s life? 
And should the patient be consulted on this? Third, may or must, the State “protect” the right to life 
even of a person who does not want to live any longer, against that person’s own wishes? Or do 
people have, under the Convention, not just a right to life, and to live – but also a right to die as and 
when they choose: to commit suicide? And if so, can they seek assistance from others to end their 
lives? And fourth: can the State allow the ending of life in order to end suffering, even if the person 
concerned cannot express his or her wishes in this respect? Perhaps surprisingly, the first, second and 
fourth of these sets of questions have not (yet) been put to the Commission or the Court – but the 
case-law  on  abortion  and  on  the  third  question  does  provide  some  indications  of  the  probable 
approach of the Court. 
The first issue could arise, in particular, in a case in which the authorities in a member State of 
the Council of Europe had decided to switch off life-support machines at a certain moment when 
4 Goodman James, The Case of Dr Munro: Are There Lessons to be Learnt?, Medical Law Review, 18, Winter 
2010, p. 564; 
5 Available at http://www.worldrtd net/taxonomy/term/475; 
6 Jukka Varelius, Voluntary Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and the Goals of Medicine, Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy, Vol. 31, No. 02, February 2006, p. 122 – 123; 
7 Available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/publications/hrhandbooks/index_handbooks_en.asp; 796  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
they deemed the person attached to the machines was no longer alive, but where this was disputed by 
relatives. However, as with the beginning of life, there is no European (or wider) legal or scientific 
consensus on when this moment is – except perhaps that death is not a moment, but a process, which 
suggests that it is scientifically, and thus arguably also legally, impossible to provide a clear-cut 
answer to the question. The Court would leave the answer to the question of when life ends – like the 
question of when life begins – primarily to the States. In practice, in the member States, the issue 
tends to be whether life-support machines can be switched off even before a person is “clinically 
dead” (whenever that may be), in order not to unduly extend the dying process
8. The question that 
arises under the Convention in such cases is whether the law in a member State which allows the 
switching off of the life-support machines still adequately “protects” the right to life of the person 
concerned. However, even in these terms the issue has not yet come up in the case-law. In view of 
the case-law on demands for assisted suicide, discussed below, it is likely that the Court, if and when 
it is faced with this issue, will leave a wide margin of discretion to the States. The issue is closely 
linked to, indeed shades into, the second question: whether it is permissible to provide palliative 
treatment to a terminally ill or dying person, if this treatment has the side effect of hastening the 
patient’s death. On this issue, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommends that 
the member States should:  
ensure that, unless the patient chooses otherwise, a terminally ill or dying person will receive 
adequate pain relief and palliative care, even if this treatment as a side-effect may contribute to the 
shortening of the individual’s life
9.
It  is  notable  that  the  Court,  in  the  case  of  Pretty  discussed  below,  expressly  referred  to 
Recommendation 1418 (1999). In view of the apparently wide consensus on this matter, and the 
express recognition of freedom of choice for the individual in this recommendation and in State 
practice, the Court is likely to accept that such an approach does not contravene the Convention. The 
fourth issue – whether euthanasia can be in accordance with the Convention even in the absence of a 
clear  expression  of  the  will  of  the  person  concerned  –  has  also  not  been  determined  by  the 
Convention  organs.  Here, too, there  is somewhat clearer ground, in  the sense that  such “mercy
killings” are clearly not regarded as acceptable in Recommendation 1418 (1999), and in that there are 
no Council of Europe member States that allow for active termination of life, other than at the request 
of the patient. Because of this apparent consensus, and given the emphasis which the Court places on 
“personal autonomy” it is possible that the Court, if confronted with this question, would feel that 
States that would depend on the circumstances of the case. The only cases in this field so far have 
concerned the third set of questions: whether a seriously physically ill but mentally fit person has a 
right to choose to die by committing suicide rather than to go on living, and whether, if so, that 
person can seek assistance from others in the taking of his or her life, or whether the State has the 
right, or the duty, to intervene to prevent this. The Court has assessed these questions at different 
times, in different contexts, and by reference not just to Article 2, but also to other articles of the 
Convention. It has, in particular, linked its considerations under Articles 2, 3 and 8 in a way that is 
illustrative of its holistic approach to the rights protected in the Convention. The 1984 case of X v. 
Germany
10 concerned a prisoner who had gone on a hunger strike and who was forcibly fed by the 
authorities.  X  complained  of  this  treatment,  arguing  that  it  constituted  inhuman  and  degrading 
8 An example is a case before the High Court of England in August 2005, in which most of the medical experts 
argued in favour of withdrawal of life support from a patient, Mr. A, but relatives, backed by one doctor, argued against 
this. The Judge, Mr Justice Kirkwood ruled against the relatives, on the basis that: “It is in [Mr A’s] best interests that 
he be allowed a peaceful and dignified death. Everything should be done to support him in that, including hydration 
and nutrition, but it’s not in his best interests that he should continue to be subjected to painful and undignified medical 
processes which do nothing to improve his terminal condition.”
9 Recommendation 1418 (1999), paragraph 9, at (a) (vii); available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?link=/ 
Documents/AdoptedText/ta99/EREC1418 htm; 
10 X v. Germany, Application no. 10565/83; 797
treatment,  contrary  to  Article  3  of  the  Convention.  However,  he  did  not  argue  that,  under  the 
Convention, he had a right to choose to die by starving himself. The Commission dismissed the 
application in the following terms: 
In the opinion of the Commission forced feeding of a person does involve degrading elements 
which in certain circumstances may be regarded as prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Under 
the Convention the High Contracting Parties are, however, also obliged to secure to everyone the 
right to life as set out in Article 2. Such an obligation should in certain circumstances call for 
positive action on the part of the Contracting Parties, in particular an active measure to save lives 
when the authorities have taken the person in question into their custody. When, as in the present 
case, a detained person maintains a hunger strike this may inevitably lead to a conflict between an 
individual’s right to physical integrity and the High Contracting Party’s obligation under Article 2 of 
the Convention – a conflict which is not solved by the Convention itself. The Commission recalls that 
under German law this conflict has been solved in that it is possible to force-feed a detained person if 
this person, due to a hunger strike, would be subject to injuries of a permanent character, and the 
forced  feeding  is  even obligatory if  an  obvious danger  for  the  individual’s  life exists.  (…)  The 
Commission is satisfied that the authorities acted solely in the best interests of the applicant when 
choosing between either respect for the applicant’s will not to accept nourishment of any kind and 
thereby incur the risk that he might be subject to lasting injuries or even die, or to take action with a 
view to securing his survival although such action might infringe the applicant’s human dignity. 
It is notable that the applicant in this case was a prisoner, and that he did not claim a “right to 
die”. Prisoners are under stress by nature of their confinement, which may make them suicidal even 
if they would not normally be, while the State authorities are under a special duty of care towards 
them. 
More pertinent to the general question about the existence of a “right to die” are therefore two 
cases, Sanles Sanles v. Spain and Pretty v. the United Kingdom. The first of these concerned a man, 
Mr Sampedro, who had been a tetraplegic since the age of twenty-five and who, from 1993, when he 
was about fifty, had tried to obtain recognition from the Spanish courts of what he claimed was his 
right to end his life, with the help of others (including, in particular, his doctor), without interference 
by the State. However, he died before the proceedings in Spain had come to an end, and the relative 
he appointed as successor to this claim, Mrs Sanles Sanles, was held by the Spanish courts and by the 
European Court of Human Rights to have no standing in the matter, i.e., in the latter forum, not to be 
a “victim” of the alleged violation of the Convention. 
The issues raised in the Sanles Sanles case did at last come directly before the Court in the 
subsequent case of Pretty v. the United Kingdom
11. The case was brought by a 43-year-old married 
woman, Mrs Dianne Pretty, who was suffering from a degenerative and incurable illness, motor 
neurone disease (the “MND”), which was at an advanced stage. Although essentially paralysed from 
the neck down, and incapable of decipherable speech, her intellect and capacity to make decisions 
were unimpaired. Frightened and distressed at the suffering and indignity she would have to endure if 
the disease were to run its course, but unable to commit suicide by herself, she wanted her husband to 
assist  her  in  this.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  committing  suicide  is  not  a  criminal  offence,  but 
encouraging or assisting someone else to commit suicide is (under the Suicide Act 1961). However, 
prosecutions  can  only  be  brought  with  the  consent  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  (the 
“DPP”), a senior law officer, who can exercise discretion in the matter. Mrs Pretty therefore sought 
an assurance from the DPP that he would not prosecute her husband if he were to assist her to 
commit suicide in accordance with her wishes, but the DPP refused. The United Kingdom courts 
upheld the DPP’s decision not to give the undertaking, after detailed analysis of the case-law of the 
European Commission and Court of Human Rights. Mrs Pretty then turned to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
11 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 2346/02; 798  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
The Court admitted the case and, apart from receiving submissions from the applicant and the 
respondent  Government,  also  allowed  third-party  interventions  by  the  Voluntary  Euthanasia 
Society
12 and by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales. The Court also quoted 
parts of paragraph 9 of Recommendation 1418 (1999) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, already mentioned, in which the Assembly recommends: 
(…) that the Committee of Ministers encourage the member States of the Council of Europe to 
respect and protect the dignity of terminally ill or dying persons in all respects: (…) 
c.  by upholding the prohibition against intentionally taking the life of terminally ill or dying 
persons, while:  
i. recognising that the right to life, especially with regard to a terminally ill or dying person, 
is guaranteed by the member States, in accordance with Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which States that “no one shall be deprived of his life intentionally”;  
ii.  recognising that a terminally ill or dying person’s wish to die never constitutes any legal 
claim to die at the hand of another person; 
iii. recognising that a terminally ill or dying person’s wish to die cannot of itself constitute a 
legal justification to carry out actions intended to bring about death
13.
The Court was quite dismissive of the claim that Article 2 of the Convention should be read 
as granting individuals a right to commit suicide. It noted, with reference to earlier case-law on 
various issues under Article 2, that, “in certain well-defined circumstances”, the article may impose a 
positive  obligation  on  State  authorities  “to  take  preventive  operational  measures  to  protect  an 
individual whose life is at risk”, and that this also applied to “the situation of a mentally ill prisoner 
who disclosed signs of being a suicide risk”. However, as the Court pointed out: 
The Court is not persuaded that “the right to life” guaranteed in Article 2 can be interpreted 
as  involving  a  negative  aspect.  (…)  Article  2  cannot,  without  a  distortion  of  language,  be 
interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a 
right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose 
death rather than life. The Court accordingly finds that no right to die, whether at the hands of a 
third person or with  the assistance of a  public authority, can  be  derived  from Article  2 of the 
Convention.  It  is  confirmed  in  this  view  by  the  recent  Recommendation  1418  (1999)  of  the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (…)
14.
However, the Court was careful to stress that this ruling did not mean that if a particular State 
does recognise such a right (as does Switzerland, for instance), that would ipso facto be contrary to 
Article 2; nor did it mean that if a State that did recognise a right to take one’s own life were to be 
held to have acted in accordance with Article 2, that would imply that the applicant, too, should be 
granted that right: 
(…) even if circumstances prevailing in a particular country which permitted assisted suicide 
were found not to infringe Article 2 of the Convention, that would not assist the applicant in this 
case, where the very different proposition – that the United Kingdom would be in breach of its 
obligations under Article 2 if it did not allow assisted suicide – has not been established
15.
The Court clearly felt that the matter should be examined under different articles, and the 
ultimate decision based on the interplay between them. The Court therefore went on to carefully 
consider the claim to a right to commit suicide in the face of terrible suffering under Article 3, which 
prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in absolute terms, and Article 8, 
which guarantees, among other things, respect for “private life”. 
12 An United Kingdom organisation favouring voluntary euthanasia; 
13 Pretty judgment, § 24; 
14 Pretty judgment, §§ 39 - 40; 
15 Pretty judgment, § 41; 799
The applicant had claimed that the suffering to which her illness would inevitably lead was so 
severe as to amount to “degrading treatment” in terms of Article 3; and that the State had a positive 
duty to take steps to protect her from this, by allowing her to obtain assistance to commit suicide
16.
However, the Court held that “Article 3 must be construed in harmony with Article 2”, which “does
not confer any right on an individual to require a State to permit or facilitate his or her death”
17.
Therefore, Article 3, also, did not impose on States a duty to allow actions to terminate life in 
cases such as hers
18. The Court took a much more positive approach to Mrs Pretty’s case under 
Article 8. In a way, this became the provision under which the difficult and sensitive issues involved 
were addressed in the greatest depth and detail. 
The Court reiterated, first of all, with reference to earlier case-law on a variety of different 
issues,  that  the  term  “private  life”  in  Article  8  “is  a  broad  term  not  susceptible  to  exhaustive 
definition”
19.  It  then  took  an  important  new  step,  by  recognising  a  new  principle  of  “personal 
autonomy” or “self-determination”:
Although no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination as being 
contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion of personal autonomy is 
an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees
20.
The Court accepted – or rather, was “not prepared to exclude” – that Mrs Pretty’s wish to 
“exercise her choice to avoid what she considers will be an undignified and distressing end to her 
life” was covered by the concept of “personal autonomy”, and that the law preventing her from 
exercising this choice thus constituted an “interference” with Mrs Pretty’s right to respect for private 
life as guaranteed under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention
21.
Recognition of the principle of “personal autonomy” enabled the Court to address the issue at 
the heart of the case: whether this principle protects the right of mentally fit individuals to choose 
death (if needs be with the assistance of others), or whether “the principle of sanctity of life” should – 
or can be allowed to – override such “self-determination”. The Court held that it was “common 
ground [between the parties] that the restriction on assisted suicide in this case was imposed by law 
and in pursuit of the legitimate aim of safeguarding life and thereby protecting the rights of others”.
The  only  issue  to  be  determined  was  therefore  whether  the  interference  was  “necessary  in  a 
democratic society”
22.
On the margin of appreciation to be accorded in making this assessment, the Court recalled 
that this margin “will vary in accordance with the nature of the issues and the importance of the 
interests at stake”
23. However, the Court disagreed with the applicant that the margin had to be 
narrow, in line with the Court’s case-law in other cases involving intimate personal matters, such as 
sexual life
24. Rather, the focus was on the issue of proportionality and prevention of arbitrariness: 
It does not appear to be arbitrary to the Court for the law to reflect the importance of the 
right  to  life,  by  prohibiting  assisted  suicide  while  providing  for  a  system  of  enforcement  and 
adjudication which allows due regard to be given in each particular case to the public interest in 
bringing a prosecution, as well as to the fair and proper requirements of retribution and deterrence. 
Nor in the circumstances is there anything disproportionate in the refusal of the DPP to give an 
advance undertaking that no prosecution would be brought against the applicant’s husband. Strong 
arguments based on the rule of law could be raised against any claim by the executive to exempt 
16 Pretty judgment, §§ 44 - 45; 
17 Pretty judgment, § 54; 
18 Pretty judgment, § 55; 
19 Pretty judgment, § 61; 
20 Pretty judgment, § 61; 
21 Pretty judgment, § 67; 
22 Pretty judgment, § 69; 
23 Pretty judgment, § 70; 
24 Pretty judgment, § 71; 800  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
individuals or classes of individuals from the operation of the law. In any event, the seriousness of 
the  act  for  which  immunity  was  claimed  was  such  that  the  decision  of  the  DPP  to  refuse  the 
undertaking sought in the present case cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court 
concludes that the interference in this case may be justified as “necessary in a democratic society” 
for the protection of the rights of others and, accordingly, that there has been no violation of Article 
8 of the Convention
25.
The crucial issue is therefore one of balance. Of particular importance is the fact that the law 
in the United Kingdom which makes it a criminal offence, in principle, to assist another person in 
committing suicide, can be applied with flexibility and restraint – or even not applied – in individual 
cases. That flexibility, that legal responsiveness to the specific circumstances, more than anything 
else, led the Court to its finding of “no violation” of Article 8. It would appear that an inflexible law 
would  have  been  disproportionate  and  thus  contrary  to  Article  8.  After  this,  the  Court  quickly 
dismissed the remaining arguments of the applicant, under Article 9, which protects the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and Article 14, which prohibits discrimination in the 
enjoyment of the Convention rights. On the former, it held that Mrs Pretty’s “claims do not involve a 
form of manifestation of a religion or belief”
26. On Article 14, it ruled that: 
(…) there is, in the Court’s view, objective and reasonable justification for not distinguishing 
in law between those who are and those who are not physically capable of committing suicide. (…) 
The borderline between the two categories will often be a very fine one and to seek to build into the 
law an exemption for those judged to be incapable of committing suicide would seriously undermine 
the protection of life which the 1961 Act was intended to safeguard and greatly increase the risk of 
abuse. Consequently, there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention in the present 
case
27.
A  few days  after  the  judgment,  Mrs  Pretty  started  having breathing  difficulties  and  was 
moved to a hospice. There, following palliative care, she slipped into a coma and died, on 11 May 
2002, twelve days after the ruling.
2.2. Assisted dying in different legislations 
The question whether assisted dying (i.e. euthanasia and assisted suicide) should be legalized 
is  often  treated,  by  judges  and  commentators  alike,  as  a  question  which  transcends  national 
boundaries and diverse legal systems. Greater caution is needed before relying on the experience of 
one jurisdiction when discussing proposals for regulation of assisted dying in others, and the possible 
consequences of such regulation.  
Assisted suicide is currently illegal in Australia, but was for a time legal in the Northern 
Territory under the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995
28. As professor Suzanne Ost mentions
29, a 
well publicised example of partially de-medicalised assisted death occurred in Australia in 1996, 
during  the  short  period  in  which  assisted  suicide  and  euthanasia  were  lawful  in  the  Northern 
Territory. Dr Philip Nitschke devised a process of computerised assisted death. He provided patients 
with intravenous access and connected the infusion tubing to a laptop computer. The patients then 
had to answer three questions which appeared on the computer screen by pressing certain keys. The 
final question was as follows: “If you press this button, you will receive a lethal injection and die in 
15 seconds— Do you wish to proceed?” If the patient answered all the questions affirmatively, the 
computer automatically switched on a previously prepared solution of a fatal dose of the sedative 
25 Pretty judgment, §§ 76-78; 
26 Pretty judgment, § 82; 
27 Pretty judgment, §§ 88-89, reference to other paragraph in the judgment omitted; 
28 The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 was passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory 
in July 1995 and repealed by the Australian Commonwealth Parliament in March 1997; 
29  Ost  Suzanne,  The  de-medicalisation  of  assisted  dying:  is  a  less medicalised  model  the  way  forward?,
Medical Law Review, 18, Winter 2010, p. 504; 801
Nembutal
30. The use of modern technology might make this example of partially de-medicalised 
assisted death seem somehow dehumanised. 
However,  Nitschke  stated  in  an  interview  that  the  process  allowed  him  “to  leave  the 
immediate personal space of the patient, so that the family could enter and be closest to the patient 
when  the  button  was  pushed”.  Thus,  arguably,  far  from  removing  the  human  element,  de-
medicalising-assisted death in this way can remove the external presence of a doctor and enable the 
act of dying to be a more personal and private experience for the person to share with those she or he 
is closest to. This is at least one reason that can be given in support of calls for the de-medicalisation 
of assisted death. 
The “Euthanasia Act” legalized euthanasia in Belgium in 2002, but it did not cover assisted 
suicide.  In  2006,  Belgium  legalized  partial  euthanasia  with  certain  regulations.  Similarly  to  the 
Netherlands, in Belgium, a doctor who performs euthanasia does not commit a crime if he or she 
ensures that “the patient is in a medically hopeless situation of persistent and unbearable physical or 
mental suffering that cannot be alleviated, resulting from a serious or incurable disorder caused by 
illness or accident”
31.
In Canada,  the  debate  on  euthanasia  peaked  in  1994  when  Sue  Rodriguez
32  publicly 
campaigned for the right to an assisted suicide
33. However, suicide is not a crime in Canada, but 
physician-assisted suicide is considered illegal. The Criminal Code of Canada states in section 241(b) 
that: 
Every one who (….) (b) aids or abets a person to commit suicide, whether suicide ensues or 
not, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen 
years.
The reason behind its illegality is due to prevent people from “assisting in suicide” of those 
that are not mentally capable of making the decision and because of the “value that society place on 
human life” which “in the eyes of the law makers, might easily be eroded if assistance in committing 
suicide were to be decriminalized”.
An article in People’s Daily reported that nine people from Xi’an City in China made news 
when they “jointly wrote to local media asking for euthanasia, or mercy killings”. These people had 
uremia, a disease due to the failure of the kidneys, and expressed their “unbearable suffering and [an 
unwillingness] to burden their families any more”. The article stated because it is illegal for doctors 
to help their patients die, all that could be done for them was to ask the doctors to ease their pain.  
In May 1997, Colombian courts allowed for the euthanasia of sick patients who requested to 
end their lives. This ruling came about due to the efforts of a group that strongly opposed euthanasia. 
When one of their members brought a lawsuit to the Colombian Supreme Court against it, the court 
issued a 6 to 3 decision that “spelled out the rights of a terminally person to engage in voluntary 
euthanasia”. Though physician assisted suicide is legal, the country has no way to document or set 
30 See Lopez Kathryn Jean, Euthanasia Sets Sail: An interview with Philip Nitschke, the other “Dr Death”,
National Review, available at http://www nationalreview.com/interrogatory/interrogatory060501.shtml; 
31 Mullock Alexandra, Overlooking the Criminally Compassionate: What Are the Implications of Prosecutorial 
Policy on Encouraging or Assisting Suicide?, Medical Law Review, 18, Winter 2010, p. 464; 
32 She suffered from the MND (just like Mrs Pretty). For more than two years, Rodriguez captivated the 
attention of Canadians during her legal challenge for a constitutional right to assisted suicide. The Supreme Court of 
Canada ultimately  denied her  this  right in a narrow 5-4  ruling  in favour  of  the  protection  of  the  sanctity  of  life 
(Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 1993). Nevertheless,  aided by  an anonymous physician, she  took an overdose of 
barbiturates  and  morphine  and  died  in  the  company  of  an  outspoken  Member  of  Parliament,  Svend  Robinson. 
Subsequent to Rodriguez’s death, a Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide held public hearings 
and eventually produced a report recommending that euthanasia and  assisted suicide remain criminal offences. In 
addition to  the  thousands of written submissions  received by  the  Committee,  hundreds  of  groups and  individuals 
presented oral testimony; 
33 Ogden Russel D. and Young Michael G., Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: A Survey of Registered Social 
Workers in British Columbia, Br. J. Social Wk. (1998) 28, p. 162; 802  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
rules and regulations for doctors and patients that want to end their lives. Though it is opposed on 
religious grounds by many Colombians, many patients have still been able to find doctors to assist 
them in ending their lives.  
In France, the controversy over legalizing euthanasia and physician assisted suicide is not as 
big  as  in  the  United  States  because  of  the  country’s  “well  developed  hospice  care  program”.
However, in 2000 the controversy over the uncontroversial topic was ignited with Vincent Humbert. 
After a car crash that left him “unable to “walk, see, speak, smell or taste”, he used the movement of 
his right thumb to write a book, “I Ask the Right to Die” (Je Vous Demande le Droit de Mourir) in 
which he voiced his desire to “die legally”. After his appeal was denied, his mother assisted in killing 
him by injecting him with an overdose of barbiturates that put him into a coma, killing him 2 days 
later. Although his mother was arrested for aiding in her son’s death and later acquitted, the case did 
jumpstart a new legislation which states that when medicine serves “no other purpose than the 
artificial support of life” they can be “suspended or not undertaken”.
Killing  somebody  in  accordance  with  their  demands  is  always  illegal  under  the  German 
criminal code
34 (section 216, “Killing at the request of the victim; mercy killing”
35). Assisting with 
suicide by, for example, providing poison or a weapon, is generally legal. Since suicide itself is legal, 
assistance  or  encouragement  is  not  punishable  by  the  usual  legal  mechanisms  dealing  with 
complicity and incitement (German criminal law follows the idea of “accessories of complicity”
which states that “the motives of a person who incites another person to commit suicide, or who 
assists in its commission, are irrelevant”). There can however be legal repercussions under certain 
conditions for a number of reasons. Aside from laws regulating firearms, the trade and handling of 
controlled substances and the like (e.g. when acquiring poison for the suicidal person), this concerns 
three points: 
Free v. manipulated will 
If the suicidal person is not acting out of their own free will, then assistance is punishable by 
any of a number of homicide offences that the criminal code provides for, as having “acted through 
another person” (section 25, par. 1 of the German criminal code). Action out of free will is not ruled 
out by the decision to end one’s life in itself; it can be assumed as long as a suicidal person “decides 
on his own fate up to the end (…) and is in control of the situation”. Free will cannot be assumed, 
however, if someone is manipulated or deceived. 
Apart from manipulation, the criminal code states three conditions under which a person is 
not acting under his own free will: 
1.if the person is under 14 years; 
2.if the person has “one of the mental diseases listed in §20 of the German Criminal Code”;
3.a person that is acting under a state of emergency.  
Under these circumstances, even if colloquially speaking one might say a person is acting of 
their own free will, a conviction of murder is possible. 
Neglected duty to rescue 
German criminal law obligates everybody to come to the rescue of others in an emergency, 
within  certain  limits  (section  323c  of  the  German  criminal  code,  “Omission  to  effect  an  easy 
rescue”
36). Under this rule, the party assisting in the suicide can be convicted if, in finding the 
suicidal person in a state of unconsciousness, they do not do everything in their power to revive 
them.  
Homicide by omission 
34 Available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb html#StGB_000P216; 
35 (1) If a person is induced to kill by the express and earnest request of the victim the penalty shall be 
imprisonment from six months to five years. 
(2) The attempt shall be punishable;
36 Whosoever does not render assistance during accidents or a common danger or emergency although it is 
necessary and can be expected of him under the circumstances, particularly if it is possible without substantial danger to 
himself and without violation of other important duties shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine; 803
German law puts certain people in the position of a warrantor for the well-being of another 
(e.g. parents, spouses, doctors and police officers). Such people might find themselves legally bound 
to do what they can to prevent a suicide; if they do not, they are guilty of homicide by omission. 
Until recently, death and dying were considered taboo or inappropriate subjects for discussion 
in Japan. Attitudes have changed primarily due to a recent case in which a doctor admitted to 
helping some of his cancer patients die by “switching or turning off their respirators”. Even though 
the Yokohama District Court established, in a 1995 ruling, guidelines under which a “mercy killing”
(active euthanasia) would not be considered murder, it appears that the doctor in this case met some 
of the guidelines but not all. 
According to the ruling, a mercy killing would not be considered a crime if: 
“the patient was suffering from unbearable pain”;
"the death of the individual was inevitable and imminent”;
“all alternative measures have been taken to relieve the pain";
“the patient makes a clear statement of his or her desire to shorten his or her life or hasten 
death”.
The problem that arose from this, in addition to the problem faced by many other families in 
the country, has led to the creation of “bioethics SWAT teams”. These teams will be made available 
to the families of terminally ill patients in order to help them, along with the doctors, come to a 
decision based on the personal facts of the case. Though in its early stages and relying on “subsidies 
from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare” there are plans to create a non-profit organization 
to “allow this effort to continue”. 
After failing to get royal assent for legalizing euthanasia and assisted suicide, in December 
2008, Luxembourg’s parliament amended the country’s constitution to take this power away from 
the monarch, the Grand Duke of Luxembourg
37. Euthanasia and assisted suicide were legalized in the 
country in April 2009
38.
In  the  Netherlands,  assisted  dying  on  request
39  is  permissible  only  where  the  “patient’s 
suffering was unbearable, and (...) there was no prospect of improvement” and both doctor and 
patient were convinced that “there was no reasonable alternative in light of the patient’s situation’
40.
South Africa is struggling with the debate over legalizing euthanasia. Due to the under-
developed health care system that pervades the majority of the country, Willem Landman, a member 
of the South African Law Commission, at a symposium on euthanasia at the World Congress of 
Family  Doctors,  stated  that  many  South  African  doctors  would  be  willing  to  perform  acts  of 
euthanasia when it became legalized in the country. He feels that because of the lack of doctors in the 
country,  “(legalizing)  euthanasia  in  South  Africa  would  be  premature  and  difficult  to  put  into 
practice (…)”. 
It is believed that in the not so distant future more countries in Africa, including Nigeria and 
Ethiopia,  will  find  reason  to  follow  the  laudable  examples  of  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  in 
legalising active euthanasia
41.
42In Switzerland, although euthanasia is illegal, assisted suicide is not an offence in its own 
right and there are several groups who assist suicide. The most publicised of these is Dignitas
43,
37  Luxembourg  strips  monarch  of  legislative  role.  Available  at  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/ 
dec/12/luxembourg-monarchy; 
38 Luxembourg becomes third EU country to legalize euthanasia. Available at http://www.tehrantimes.com/ 
Index_view.asp?code=191410; 
39 The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2002; 
40 Mullock Alexandra, op. cit., p. 464; 
41 Nwafor Anthony O., Comparative perspectives on euthanasia in Nigeria and Ethiopia, African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 18.2 (2010): 170-191, Edinburgh University Press, p. 191; 
42  Dyer  Karen,  Raising  Our  Heads  Above  the  Parapet?  Societal  Attitudes  to  Assisted  Suicide  and 
Consideration of the Need for Law Reform in England and Wales, The Denning Law Journal 2009 Vol 21, p. 42; 804  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
whose motto is “to live with dignity, to die with dignity”. Swiss members of Dignitas are able to die 
in their own homes, but obviously this is not possible for “suicide tourists”
44.
Though it is illegal to assist a patient in dying in some circumstances, there are others where 
there is no offence committed. The relevant provision of the Swiss Criminal Code refers to “a person 
who, for selfish reasons, incites someone to commit suicide or who assists that person in doing so 
will, if the suicide was carried out or attempted, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to 5 
years or a term of imprisonment”.
A person brought to court on a charge could presumably avoid conviction by proving that 
they were “motivated by the good intentions of bringing about a requested death for the purposes of 
relieving suffering” rather than for “selfish” reasons. In order to avoid conviction, the person has to 
prove that the deceased knew what he or she was doing, had capacity to make the decision, and had 
made an “earnest” request, meaning he/she asked for death several times. The person helping also 
has to avoid actually doing the act that leads to death, lest they be convicted under Article 114: 
Killing on request
45. For instance, it should be the suicide subject who actually presses the syringe or 
takes the pill, after the helper had prepared the setup. This way the country can criminalise certain 
controversial acts, which many  of its  people would oppose, while  legalising a narrow  range  of 
assistive acts for some of those seeking help to end their lives. 
The status of healthy individuals seeking to end their own lives remains unresolved under 
Swiss law. As of 2009, Dignitas was pursuing the case of a Canadian couple, Betty and George 
Coumbias, who wished to end their lives simultaneously. In July 2009, British conductor Sir Edward 
Downes and his wife Joan died together at a suicide clinic outside Zürich “under circumstances of 
their own choosing”. Sir Edward was not terminally ill, but his wife was diagnosed with rapidly 
developing cancer.  
In March 2010, a television in the United States showed a documentary called “The Suicide 
Tourist” which told the story of Professor Craig Ewert, his family, and Dignitas, and their decision to 
commit  assisted  suicide  using  Sodium  Pentobarbital  in Switzerland  after  he  was diagnosed  and 
suffering with ALS.
Several attempts to legalize assisted suicide have been rejected by the UK Parliament. In the 
meantime the DPP has clarified the criteria under which an individual will be prosecuted for assisting 
in another person’s suicide.  
Assisted suicide is legal in the three American states of Oregon (via the Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act
46), Washington (by Washington Death with Dignity Act), and Montana (through the 
2009 trial court ruling Baxter v. Montana). There are relatively substantial barriers to the use of some 
of these provisions. 
For instance, in  Oregon
47, assisted suicide  is available only to those with an imminently 
terminal illness, which is defined as “an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically 
confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgement, produce death within six months”. The 
person must be a “resident” of Oregon. A written request for prescription and two oral requests from 
the patient are also needed to escape criminal liability, plus written confirmation by doctor that the 
act is voluntary and informed.  
43 Founded in 1998 by the Swiss lawyer, Ludwig Minelli, Dignitas is a nonprofit organisation set up to assist 
those with “medically diagnosed hopeless or incurable illness, unbearable pain or unendurable disabilities”;
44 For non-Swiss residents, Dignitas once rented a flat in an apartment block in the residential suburb of 
Wiedikon in Zurich. Unsurprisingly there were complaints and they were evicted from the flat. At one point, whilst 
looking for new accommodation, they assisted the death of a German “suicide tourist” in a car park. The organisation 
currently operates in a business park in the village of Schwerzenbach; 
45 A person who, for decent reasons, especially compassion, kills a person on the basis of his or her serious 
and insistent request, will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment;
46 Available at http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/ors.shtml; 
47 The Oregon Death with Dignity Act 1994; 805
Neither the Romanian legislation recognizes the right to die, the Romanian Criminal Code 
stipulating that: 
The deed to induce or facilitate a person’s suicide, whether suicide or attempted suicide 
took place, is strictly punished by imprisonment from 2 to 7 years
48.
The abandonment, relegation or leaving without help, in any way, of a child or a person 
who is not possible to take care of herself by the person who has it in her custody or care, putting in 
immediate danger, her life, health or physical integrity, is strictly punished with imprisonment from 
one year to three years or with a day-fine
49.
Listed  below  are  some  major  organizations  that  support  assisted  suicide:  Dignitas,  Exit 
International,  Euthanasia  Research  &  Guidance  Organizationent,  Death  with  Dignity  National 
Center, Compassion & Choices, World Federation of Right to Die Societies, Final Exit Network, 
Dying with Dignity, Dignity in Dying, Dying with Dignity Victoria, Dignity New Zealand. 
It should be noted that there are many health care professionals, especially those concerned 
with bioethics, who are opposed to assisted dying due to the detrimental effects that the procedure 
can have with regard to vulnerable populations and to the fact that it transforms a healing profession 
into a killing profession. This argument is known as the “slippery slope” argument
50. This argument 
encompasses  the  apprehension  that  once  assisted  dying  is  initiated  for  the  terminally  ill  it  will 
progress to other vulnerable communities and may begin to be used by those who feel less worthy 
based on their demographic or socioeconomic status. In addition, vulnerable populations are more at 
risk of untimely deaths because, patients might be subjected to assisted dying without their genuine 
consent. However, recent studies show that the available evidence suggests that the legalisation of 
physician-assisted suicide might actually decrease the prevalence of involuntary euthanasia.  
Also, prejudices against disabled people may be enacted with regards to end of life care. For 
example, do not resuscitate orders are more frequently issued for those who become hospitalized and 
previously  suffer  from  severe  disabilities.  In  addition,  many  people  who  suffer  from  lifelong 
disabilities suffer from “burn out”, which is a general feeling of depression and sadness that comes as 
a result of years of intolerance and prejudice. Naturally, those individuals suffering from “burn out”
are more likely to want to refuse treatment and end their fight for life prematurely. 
2.3. Improvements in end of life decision making 
Currently only a small fraction of patients, about 15% have clear directions in the form of a 
living will or a health care proxy in place to advise family members or physicians of their end of life 
wishes. This leads to uncomfortable questions if the patient suddenly no longer has the ability to 
speak for themselves when answers are needed to important medical questions. Even if a patient has 
selected a proxy they may, “be guilt ridden, wondering whether they acted to hastily or if their 
decision was inconsistent with the patient's desires”. 
In order to preempt some of the difficulties that are associated with end of life care many 
medical schools and nursing programs now stress the importance of early discussions with the patient 
about their wishes and planning for the future. Unfortunately, since the views concerning physician 
assisted suicide are so polarizing, many doctors are reluctant to discuss withholding and withdrawing 
life sustaining treatment. In fact, in a recent study of 58 physicians, 19 admitted that they did not feel 
comfortable discussing end of life care with their patients.  
In an effort to change the apprehension that is associated with end of life care new techniques 
are being explored to ensure more doctor to patient communication including: 
analyzing the cognitive ability of the patient to make their own decision regarding end of 
life care; 
48 Article 182 (1) of the Romanian Criminal Code; 
49 Article 198 (1) of the Romanian Criminal Code; 
50 Available at http://www nytimes.com/2009/09/07/opinion/07douthat html; 806  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
encouraging doctors to initiate end of life conversations; 
making sure that the patient is made fully aware of all options regarding their personal 
medical treatment; 
providing counseling and support for families of patients especially in situations where a 
decision to remove life support and/or stop treatment is involved. 
In short there are two major ways in which the physicians can more easily be made aware of 
the wishes of their patients. The first of which simply involves participation in the informed consent 
process or, “engaging competent patients in comprehensive discussions of treatment options and 
likely outcomes”. The second of these methods involves advance care planning which ensures that 
patients tell their doctors exactly what they wish to be done in case a medical emergency arises in 
which they are not able to speak for themselves. 
3. Conclusions 
The topics of euthanasia and assisted suicide are of profound importance in terms of law, 
ethics, religion, and social values
51.
Should we defend the right of each individual to live by her/his own personal values, and the 
freedom to make decisions about her/his own life so long as this does not result in harm to others? 
Currently, the needs and autonomy of patients are often disregarded. Compassionate doctors, who 
follow the wishes of their terminally ill patients by assisting them to die, risk being charged with 
assisting suicide or murder. The current system sometimes also results in close relatives being faced 
with immensely difficult choices: whether to assist a loved one who is begging for help to put an end 
to their suffering knowing that it is unlawful, or to deny their loved one the death they want. Is it 
right that anyone should be put into the position of having to make such choices, or indeed into a 
position where they believe that they have no other option but personally to end the life of someone 
they love?  
After  all,  who  can  say  for  sure  that  assisted  dying  is  good  or  bad?  We  know  what  a 
respectable life means, but we can hardly imagine what means a respectable death. That is the reason 
why assisted dying provokes in us different reactions. 
As regards the religious perspective, it may be of interest to observe here that the late Catholic 
Pontiff, Pope John Paul II, in spite of his avowed stand against euthanasia, expressed a wish at the 
terminal days of his life, and which was respected by the College of Cardinals, as widely reported in 
the news media, to be allowed to die peacefully in the Papal home at the Vatican. Could his pains, 
suffering and imminent death not have been prolonged by advanced medical technology if he was 
taken to the hospital? The only reasonable response at that point in time is that prolonging his death 
has no utilitarian value. By respecting his wish, the Cardinals had either advertently or inadvertently 
assisted the Pope to die
52.
The  domestic  policies  may  merely  succeed  in  encouraging  people  to  seek  help  abroad, 
because no meaningful help is available at home
53. This approach may also encourage people to seek 
an  assisted  suicide  sooner  than  they  might  otherwise  because  of  the  need  to  travel  abroad  to 
Switzerland whilst they remain able to do so. Unlike other jurisdictions where assisted dying is 
permitted, certain Swiss cantons allow non-Swiss residents to avail themselves of the services of 
Swiss assisted suicide organisations such as Dignitas.
Within  the  social  and  legal  debate  surrounding  assisted  death,  the  focus  in  recent  times 
appears to have moved away from a doctor’s involvement in a clinically assisted death to “suicide 
tourism” and particularly, the matter of relatives “assisting” by making travel arrangements and 
51 Ogden Russel D. and Young Michael G., op. cit., p. 161; 
52 Nwafor Anthony O., op. cit., p. 191; 
53 Mullock Alexandra, op. cit., p. 450; 807
accompanying their loved ones to a country in which, according  to local law, they can receive 
assistance to die. Of course, the question of whether an individual must be suffering from a medical 
condition in order for assisted death to be legitimate is increasingly being raised. 
Ultimately, if a practice judged by many to be undesirable is, in any case, occurring, even 
those opposed to it may recognize that rather than merely having the opportunity for retrospective 
appraisal and possible punishment, control through legalisation is a more satisfactory approach
54.
Definitely, the assisted dying is a very delicate subject and a painful problem. Analysing it 
with freedom and responsibility does not mean to blame its supporters
55. Whatever the outcome is, it 
is clear that this area needs much more open debate from all levels of society, not just those groups 
who hold steadfast but extremist views on either side of the argument. 
Finally, we should try to find in ourselves the answer to the first question of this article: is it 
possible that human rights are limited to life or can they be extended also to death?
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